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In the 1970s macroeconomists often disagreed bitterly. Macroeconomists have now largely converged
on method, model design, and macroeconomic policy advice. The disagreements that remain all
stem from the practical implementation of the methodology. Some macroeconomists think that New
Keynesian models are on the verge of being useful for quarter-to-quarter quantitative policy advice.
We do not. We argue that the shocks in these models are dubiously structural and show that many
of the features of the model as well as the implications due to these features are inconsistent with
microeconomic evidence. These arguments lead us to conclude that New Keynesian models are not
yet useful for policy analysis.
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expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
or the Federal Reserve System.Viewed from a distance modern macroeconomists, whether New Keynesian or neo-
classical, are all alike, at least in the sense that we use the same methodology, work with
similar models, agree on what reduced form shocks are needed to ￿t the data, and agree on
broad principles for policy. Viewed up close, however, there is considerable disagreement.
This disagreement revolves around a new set of shocks as well as a new set of features that
have been introduced in the recent New Keynesian literature. In this paper we argue that
these new shocks are dubiously structural and that the new features are inconsistent with
microeconomic evidence. Until these issues are resolved, the New Keynesian models are not
useful for policy advice.
Consider ￿rst the areas of agreement. In terms of methodology we all agree that
in order do serious policy analysis, we need a structural model with primitive interpretable
shocks which are invariant to the class of policy interventions being considered.
Macroeconomic models are also similar. In practice, most macroeconomists now ana-
lyze policy using dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. These models can
be so generally de￿ned that they incorporate all types of frictions, including various ways
of learning, incomplete markets, imperfections in markets, spatial frictions, and so on. The
only practical restriction from these models is that they specify an agreed-upon language by
which we communicate. A standard aphorism is that if you have a coherent story to propose,
then you can do so in a suitably elaborate DSGE model.
Macroeconomists are also beginning to agree on the nature of reduced form shocks
needed to ￿t the data. In Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007), henceforth CKM we argue
that two reduced form shocks, which we term the e¢ ciency wedge and the labor wedge play
a central role in generating business cycle ￿ uctuations. The e¢ ciency wedge, at face value,
looks like time-varying productivity and the labor wedge distorts the static relationship the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor and the marginal product of
labor. A consensus appears to be emerging on the importance of these reduced form shocks
over the business cycle. This emerging consensus implies that we need to develop structural
models which generate these wedges from primitive interpretable shocks.
Modern macroeconomists also broadly concur on the desirable properties of monetary
policy. First, the success of policy depends on policymakers￿commitment. Second, interestrates and in￿ ation rates should be kept low on average. More practically, most macroecono-
mists are comfortable with some form of in￿ ation targets with well-de￿ned escape clauses.
Disagreement stems primarily from di⁄erences in model building and assessment. One
tradition, which we prefer, is to keep the model very simple, keep the number of parameters
small and well-motivated by micro facts, and put up with the reality that such a model neither
can nor should ￿t most aspects of the data. Such a model can still be very useful in clarifying
how to think about policy. Typical examples are the general equilibrium models of optimal
￿scal policy pioneered by Lucas and Stokey (1983) which make clear general principles, such
as the optimality of smoothing distortions over time and across states. When these models
are quantitatively implemented, a simple rule of thumb used to discourage the adding of
free parameters is that every time a new parameter is added, some new micro evidence to
discipline that parameter should be added as well.
The other tradition, typi￿ed by the work of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005)
and Smets and Wouters (2007), emphasizes the need to ￿t macro aggregates well. The urge
to ￿t these aggregates well leads researchers in this tradition to add many more features and
shocks and then try to use the same old aggregate data as before to estimate the associated
new parameters without the discipline of microeconomic evidence.
The main concern we have about the second tradition is that it leads to models that
are not useful for policy analysis. We make this concern concrete by critiquing the recent New
Keynesian literature, as typi￿ed by the model in Smets and Wouters (2007). We focus on
this model because it is widely considered the state-of-the-art New Keynesian model. Indeed,
a version of it is now being used at the European Central Bank to help inform policymaking.
Proponents of the New Keynesian model argue that it is promising for two reasons. It
represents a detailed economy that can generate the type of wedges we see in the data from
interpretable primitive shocks; and second, it has enough microfoundations that both their
shocks and parameters are structural, in that they can reasonably be argued to be invariant
to monetary policy shocks. A model with both of these features would potentially be useful
for monetary policy analysis.
We disagree. We argue that these models cannot generate the type of wedges we see
in the data from interpretable primitive shocks. And it is doubtful that many of the features
2added on in the quantitative implementation of the models are structural. Hence, the models
are not yet useful for policy analysis.
The Smets-Wouters model has seven exogenous random variables. We divide these
into two groups. The potentially structural shocks group includes shocks to total factor
productivity, investment-speci￿c technology, and monetary policy. The dubiously structural
shocks group includes shocks to wage markups, price markups, exogenous spending, and risk
premia.
Consider, for example, the wage-markup shock. This shock is modeled as arising from
￿ uctuations in the elasticity of substitution across di⁄erent types of labor. We argue that
this interpretation makes little sense. When we express this shock in units of a markup it
has a mean of 50% and a standard deviation of over 2,500%. Clearly, this level of volatil-
ity is patently absurd when it is interpreted as re￿ ecting variations in the the elasticity of
substitution between carpenters, plumbers, neurosurgeons and the like.
We show that introducing the two markup shocks amounts to mechanically sticking
in a labor wedge into the model. We thus argue that these shocks are not structural and
search for other interpretations. We show that these shocks are equally as interpretable as
￿ uctuations in the bargaining power of unions or ￿ uctuations in the value of leisure of con-
sumers. We show that policy implications vary drastically depending on what interpretation
is adopted. Furthermore, either interpretation seems strained. In the bargaining power view,
a contagious attack of greediness among workers leads them to demand higher wages. In
general equilibrium, this attempt is frustrated, and these workers simply bid themselves out
of jobs. In the ￿ uctuating value of leisure view, a contagious attack of laziness among work-
ers leads them all to take vacations by quitting, thus causing the economic downturn. Many
macroeconomists will ￿nd either interpretation uninteresting and hence will ￿nd the model
not an attractive guide for policy.
The exogenous spending (or government spending) shock is also not structural. This
shock has little to do with actual government spending since it has 3.5 times the variance of
measured government spending in the data. Rather it is de￿ned residually from the national
income identity and includes variables such as net exports which are clearly not invariant
to monetary policy. The risk premium shock is both enormous (it has 6 times the variance
3of short term nominal rates) and has little interpretation as it stands. We argue that it
is best interpreted as a ￿ ight to quality shock that a⁄ects the attractiveness of short term
government debt relative to other assets. Such a shock is unlikely to be invariant to monetary
policy.
We then turn to two other structurally dubious features: backward indexation and the
common speci￿cation of the Taylor rule. We argue that they are both inconsistent with the
data. Consider the backward indexation of prices. This feature is a mechanical way for the
model to match the persistence of in￿ ation. We show that this feature is ￿ atly inconsistent
with the micro data on prices. Consider next the Taylor rule, which is a speci￿cation of how
the Federal Reserve sets the short-term nominal rate as a function of what it observes. We
argue that the Smets-Wouters speci￿cation, which follows a long tradition in assuming the
short rate is stationary and ergodic, is incapable of generating anything close to the observed
behavior of the long-term nominal rate. Since the behavior of the long-term rate re￿ ects
in an important way how the policy instrument, the short rate, a⁄ects the real side of the
economy, misspecifying this relationship leads to a very inaccurate assessment of policy.
We argue that the last two problems, the backward indexation and the dubious spec-
i￿cation of Fed policy, may be linked. Once we specify the Fed￿ s policy as having a random
walk￿ like component, the resulting model can ￿t the aggregates without the structurally du-
bious backward indexation. (See Cogley and Sbordone 2005.) In particular, the persistence
of in￿ ation seen in the data naturally follows from the persistence of policy, instead of having
to be tacked on to the model in a mechanical way. To see why getting the true structure
correct is critical for policy, consider the costs of an abrupt disin￿ ation. With backwardly
indexed prices, these costs are huge; without them, the costs are tiny. Thus even though
tacking on mechanical, structurally dubious features can improve a model￿ s ￿t doing so may
render it useless for policy analysis.
So far we have argued that the New Keynesian model is not useful for policy analysis.
Nonetheless, we have argued that the neoclassical economists and New Keynesian economists
broadly concur in their policy recommendations. How can this be?
To answer this question we need some historical perspective. The major con￿ icts in
terms of macro policy in the postwar era was between the Old Keynesians and the neoclassical
4economists. The Old Keynesian view is eloquently and forcefully summarized by Modigliani
(1977, p. 1), who argues that the fundamental practical policy implication that Old Key-
nesians agree on is that the private economy ￿needs to be stabilized, can be stabilized, and
therefore should be stabilized by appropriate monetary and ￿scal policies.￿The neoclassical
economists recommended very di⁄erent policy: commitment to low average in￿ ation rates on
the monetary side and tax smoothing on the ￿scal side. Moreover, neoclassical economists
argued that even e¢ cient allocations could ￿ uctuate sizably.
What seems not to be su¢ ciently appreciated in the profession is that even though
the New Keynesian model has many of the elements of the Old Keynesian stories, such
as sticky prices, the policy implications are drastically di⁄erent from the Old Keynesian
recommendations and remarkably close to those of the neoclassical economists. We illustrate
this argument with the work of Correia, Nicolini, and Teles (2008) who show that given a
su¢ ciently rich set of instruments, optimal policy in a sticky price model is exactly the same
as it is in a ￿ exible price neoclassical model.
How did this convergence in policy recommendations of New Keynesians and neoclas-
sicals happen? Three considerations drive us to the view that the main convergence was
from the Old Keynesian view to the New Keynesian view, which turns out to be very close
to where the neoclassical view has been all along. First, since modern macroeconomists use
equilibrium models with forward-looking private agents, a commitment to rules is essential
for good economic performance. Second, even in the frictionless version of all modern mod-
els, e¢ cient allocations ￿ uctuate sizably. In this sense, even under optimal policy, the model
will display sizable business cycle ￿ uctuations, and eliminating all of these ￿ uctuations is
bad policy. Third, New Keynesian models typically incorporate sticky prices or wages, and
optimal monetary policy in such models typically keeps in￿ ation low and stable in order to
avoid sectoral misallocations.
1. Setting up our Critique
Here we use CKM￿ s framework of business cycle accounting to make two points that set
up our critique of the New Keynesian model. First, we show that a particular shock, referred
to as the labor wedge plays a central role over the business cycle especially in accounting for
5employment ￿ uctuations. Second, we show that the precise sense in which the labor wedge
is a reduced form shock by showing that two structural models with very di⁄erent policy
implications are consistent with the same labor wedge.
In our critique below we argue that the wage markup shock in the New Keynesian
model is essentially the labor wedge in our accounting framework. As such, not surprisingly
it plays an important role in accounting for employment. We argue that it is no more
structural than the labor wedge. Hence, the New Keynesian model is not useful for policy
analysis. We show that similar arguments apply to many of the other shocks in the New
Keynesian model.
A. Reduced Form Versus Structural Shocks
We begin by clarifying the distinction between reduced form and structural shocks.
This distinction is critical in policy analysis. The reason is that in order to do policy analysis,
we need to predict the consequences of changes in policy both for outcomes of the standard
economic variables and for welfare. Such a prediction is possible only with a structural model.
Speci￿cally, a structural model must have two ingredients. First, the relevant elements of
the model￿ including the shocks￿ must be invariant with respect to the policy interventions
considered. Second, the shocks must be interpretable, so that we know whether they are what
could be thought of as ￿good shocks￿that policy should accommodate or ￿bad shocks￿that
policy should o⁄set. Shocks which have both of these properties are referred to as structural
shocks and ones that do not are referred to as reduced-form shocks.
CKM argued that a simple business cycle model augmented with several reduced
form shocks, referred to as wedges, could account for much of the observed movements in
macroeconomic aggregates in the data. In particular, one shock, referred to as the labor
wedge plays a central role in accounting for employment in the data. CKM showed that
such a model with these reduced form shocks could account for much of the movements in
economic aggregates. While CKM argues that understanding which reduced form shocks are
needed to ￿t the data can be very useful in determining which classes of structural models
are promising, by itself such a model is useless for policy analysis.
6B. A Growth Model With Reduced Form Shocks
We begin with a prototype growth model which is a standard business cycle model
with four reduced form shocks, referred to as wedges: the e¢ ciency wedge At; the labor wedge
1 ￿ ￿lt; the investment wedge 1=(1 + ￿xt), and the government consumption wedge gt.
In this economy, consumers maximize expected utility over per capita consumption ct






subject to the budget constraint
ct + (1 + ￿xt)xt = (1 ￿ ￿lt)wtlt + rtkt + Tt
and the capital accumulation law
kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)kt + xt; (1)
where kt denotes the per capita capital stock, xt per capita investment, wt the wage rate, rt
the rental rate on capital, ￿ the discount factor, ￿ the depreciation rate of capital, and Tt
per capita lump-sum transfers. Notice that in this prototype economy, the e¢ ciency wedge
resembles a blueprint technology parameter, and the labor wedge and the investment wedge
resemble tax rates on labor income and investment.
The equilibrium of this prototype economy is summarized by the resource constraint,
ct + xt + gt = yt; (2)
where yt denotes per capita output, together with
yt = AtF(kt;lt); (3)
Ult
Uct
= (1 ￿ ￿lt)AtFlt; and (4)
Uct (1 + ￿xt) = Et [￿Uct+1fAt+1Fkt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿xt+1)g]; (5)
where, here and throughout, notations like Uct, Ult, Flt, and Fkt denote the derivatives of the
utility function and the production function with respect to their arguments.
7CKM show that the e¢ ciency and labor wedges together account for essentially all
the movement in output and that the labor wedge plays a central role in accounting for the
movement in labor, both for the Great Depression period and in postwar business cycles.
Here we focus on the labor wedge. To get a feel for this wedge, in Figure 1, we report
on U.S. output (relative to trend) and the measured labor wedges for the Great Depression
period from 1929 to 1939. We see that the underlying distortions that manifest themselves
as labor wedges became substantially worse from 1929 to 1933 and stayed roughly at this
level at least until 1939. In Figure 2, we plot the 1929￿ 39 data for U.S. labor, along with the
model￿ s predictions for labor when the model includes just the labor wedge. We see that the
model captures almost all of the movements in labor. (See CKM for details.)
C. Two Structural Models That Generate Labor Wedges
We brie￿ y discuss two structural models that can give rise to the labor wedge in a
prototype economy and their policy implications. The ￿rst model has government policies
toward unions ￿ uctuate. The second model has the consumer￿ s value of leisure ￿ uctuate.
This discussion is useful in two ways. First, it helps focus attention on particular
promising models of the labor wedge. Second, it sets up our discussion of possible interpre-
tations of the markup shock in Smets and Wouters￿(2007) model and our discussion of how
radically di⁄erent are the policy implications under the two interpretations.
Fluctuating Government Policy Toward Unions
Consider, then, the following economy in which ￿ uctuations in policies toward unions
show up as ￿ uctuations in labor market distortions in the an associated prototype economy
with reduced form shocks. (See Cole and Ohanian (2004) for a discussion of such policies
during the Great Depression.)
The technology for producing ￿nal goods from capital and a labor aggregate after a
















8is an aggregate of the di⁄erentiated types of labor l(i;st). Capital is accumulated according















where q(st) is the price of a unit of consumption goods at st in an abstract unit of account and
w(st) is the aggregate real wage at st. The producer￿ s problem can be stated in two parts.
First, the producer chooses sequences for capital k(st￿1); investment x(st); and aggregate

















is the aggregate wage.
There is a representative union that, when setting its wage, faces a downward-sloping




























and the borrowing constraint b(st+1) ￿ ￿b; where ld(i;st) is given by (9): Here b(i;st;st+1)
denotes the consumers￿holdings of one-period state-contingent bonds purchased in period t
and state st, with payo⁄s contingent on some particular state st+1 at t + 1; and q(st+1jst)
is the bonds￿corresponding price. Clearly, q(st+1jst) = q(st+1)=q(st): Also, d(st) = y(st) ￿
x(st)￿w(st)l(st) are the dividends paid by the ￿rms: The initial conditions b(i;s0) are given
and assumed to be the same for all i:
The only distorted ￿rst-order condition for this problem is
w(i;s




Notice that real wages are set as a markup over the marginal rate of substitution between
labor and consumption. Clearly, given the symmetry among the consumers, we know that
9all of them choose the same consumption, labor, bond holdings, and wages, which we denote
by c(st); l(st); b(st+1); and w(st); and the resource constraint is as in (2).
We think of government pro-competitive policy as limiting the monopoly power of
unions by pressuring them to limit their anti-competitive behavior. We model the government
policy as enforcing provisions that make the unions price competitively if the markups exceed,
say, ￿ ￿(st); where ￿ ￿(st) ￿ ￿: Under such a policy, then, the markup charged by unions is ￿ ￿(st);
so that the key distorted ￿rst-order condition is that
w(s





We now show that this detailed economy has aggregate allocations which coincide with
those in a prototype economy. In that prototype economy, the ￿rm maximizes the present














































where ￿(st) is a tax on labor income, d(st) = F(k(st￿1);l(st))￿x(st)￿w(st)l(st) are dividends,
and T(st) = ￿(st)w(st)l(st) are lump-sum transfers : The resource constraint is as in (2). The







Comparing (12) and (16), we see that the following proposition immediately follows:
Proposition 1. Consider the prototype economy just described with the following stochastic




1 + ￿ ￿(st)
: (17)
10The equilibrium allocations and prices of this prototype economy coincide with those of the
unionized economy.
Note that in this structural model the equilibrium allocations are ine¢ cient. The
optimal policy of the government is to limit the monopoly power of unions to the greatest
extent possible. Crudely put, relentless union-busting is optimal.
Fluctuating Utility of Leisure
In the detailed economy, let consumers￿discounted utility be of the form (14), where








t)) +  (s
t)v(1 ￿ l(s
t)); (18)
where  (st) is an exogenous stochastic shock to the utility of leisure. The consumer maximizes












The ￿rm￿ s problem here is identical to that in (13). The consumer￿ s ￿rst-order condition for







The associated prototype economy is nearly identical to the one described above. The














which is the same separable form as in (18) except there is now no shock to the utility of
leisure. The ￿rm maximizes pro￿ts of the form (13). The consumer￿ s ￿rst-order condition in
this prototype economy is that
v0(1 ￿ l(st))
u0(c(st))
= [1 ￿ ￿(s
t)]w(s
t):
The following proposition is then immediate:
Proposition 2. Consider the prototype economy just described with the following stochastic






11The equilibrium allocations and prices of this prototype economy coincide with those of the
detailed economy with a ￿ uctuating value of leisure.
The policy implications for this structural model are simple: the equilibrium alloca-
tions are e¢ cient so laissez-faire is optimal.
In sum, even though the union model and the leisure model generate the same observa-
tions as the prototype model with reduced form shocks, the models have drastically di⁄erent
policy implications.
2. Our Critique of New Keynesian Models
In our view the New Keynesian model is not very much di⁄erent from the prototype
growth model with reduced form shocks described above. From this perspective it is equally
useless for policy analysis.
As we have noted we have divided the seven exogenous random variables in the Smets-
Wouters model into two groups. The potentially structural shocks group includes total factor
productivity, investment-speci￿c technology, and monetary policy. The dubiously structural
shocks group includes wage markups, price markups, exogenous spending, and risk premia.
A. The Dubiously Structural Shocks
We begin by showing that the dubiously structural shocks play an important role in
the New Keynesian model. We then discuss why these shocks are di¢ cult to interpret as
structural.
Importance of the Dubiously Structural Shocks
Using the estimated Smets-Wouters model, we can back out a predicted time series for
aggregate variables for any combination of the stochastic shocks. In Figures 3A, 3B, and 3C
we plot actual (logged-detrended) output, hours, and in￿ ation for the U.S. economy and the
predicted values of the variables from the Smets and Wouters model with just the dubiously
structural shocks1. These ￿gures show that the dubiously structural shocks account for a
sizable fraction of the movements in output, most of the movements in labor, and virtually
1Labor in the U.S. data is measured as total hours worked per person in the nonfarm business sector
multiplied by the total number of civilians employed (workers aged age 16 years and older).
12all of the movements in in￿ ation.
In Table 1 we report the variance decomposition of forecast errors at horizons of 4
quarters, 10 quarters, and the unconditional variance decomposition for output, labor, and
in￿ ation. We also report the sum of the variances due to the four dubiously structural
shocks. This table con￿rms the visual impression of the ￿gures. For example, at a horizon of
10 quarters the forecast error variance for output, hours, and in￿ ation due to the dubiously
structural shocks are about 44%, 69%, and 87% respectively.
The Dubiousness of the Dubiously Structural Shocks
Given that the shocks to the wage-markup, price-markup, exogenous spending, and
risk premia play a central role in generating ￿ uctuations we now turn to arguing these shocks
are not structural. For the wage-markup and the price-markup shocks we will argue that
these are reduced form shocks in the sense that they are subject to multiple interpretations
with very di⁄erent policy implications. For the remaining two shocks we argue that it is
doubtful that the shocks are invariant with respect to policy.
The Wage-Markup Shock￿ A Fancy Name for a Labor Wedge? In the Smets-
Wouters model, one shock, the wage-markup shock, accounts for a signi￿cant fraction of the
￿ uctuations in aggregates, especially labor. This shock appears as an additive shock in a
linearized wage equation that relates current wages to past and expected future wages. We
argue that this shock is a dubiously structural reduced-form shock that mechanically plays
exactly the same role as our labor wedge. In this sense this shock can be interpreted in at least
two ways: either ￿ uctuations in workers￿bargaining power or shocks to leisure. As we have
argued above, these interpretations have radically di⁄erent implications for policy. Obviously,
then, until we have concrete microevidence in favor of at least one of these interpretations,
the New Keynesian model should not be used for policy analysis.
The additive shock to the linearized wage equation in the Smets-Wouters model is
motivated as coming from shocks to the labor aggregator. This labor aggregator relates











13where ￿t is referred to as the wage-markup shock. For intuition￿ s sake, we ￿nd it useful to
focus discussion on a special case of this aggregator, the constant-elasticity of substitution











Clearly, making ￿t stochastic is just a simple way to make stochastic the elasticity of substi-
tution between di⁄erent types of labor in the labor aggregator (23), namely, (1 + ￿t)=￿t.
Given our business cycle accounting analysis, we are not surprised that this wage-
markup shock plays a important role in generating ￿ uctuations. We argue that this shock is
equivalent to a labor wedge. To see this equivalence, consider a stripped down ￿ exible-wage
version of the Smets-Wouters model with period utility function u(ct;1￿lt). Here, as in our
union interpretation above, think of consumers as being organized into unions, so that the
ith union consists of all consumers with labor of type i: The ￿rst-order condition for union i
is to set the nominal wage for that type of labor Wt(i) so that the corresponding real wage
wt(i) = Wt(i)=Pt satis￿es wt(i) = (1+￿t)ult=uct: Since all unions are symmetric, wt(i) equals
the aggregate real wage wt. This model therefore implies that




(If we also abstract from sticky prices and monopoly power by ￿rms, both of which play a
quantitatively minor role in generating ￿ uctuations in labor in the Smets-Wouters model, we
have that the real wage equals the marginal product of labor.)
Now compare the wedge between the real wage and the marginal utility of leisure in
(24) to the corresponding wedges in the two models described earlier and characterized by
equations (17) and (21) of Propositions 1 and 2. Clearly, all the wage-markup shock ￿t does is
generate a labor wedge in the model. In this sense, adding this shock is completely equivalent
to mechanically sticking into the model an exogenous labor wedge, as we did in the prototype
model.
We have already argued that the wedges identi￿ed in business cycle accounting cannot,
by themselves, be used for policy analysis. Can the wage-markup shock? Consider a literal
interpretation in which the wage-markup shock consists of ￿ uctuations in the elasticity of
substitution for di⁄erent types of labor. To help with interpretation of units, we consider
14the constant-elasticity of substitution case with the labor aggregates given by (23). We
re-estimated the Smets-Wouters model for this case after imposing, as Smets-Wouters did,
that the mean markup was 50%. We found that the standard deviation of the markup
was absurdly large, 2,587%. In the Smets-Wouters model, ￿ uctuations in ￿t; taken literally,
correspond to ￿ uctuations in the elasticity of substitution ((1 + ￿t)=￿t) between carpenters,
plumbers, neurosurgeons, and the like. We take it as a given that everyone, including Smets
and Wouters, would regard these ￿ uctuations as being several orders of magnitude outside of
a reasonable range. Hence, a literal interpretation of the wage-markup shock is not palatable.
We view it instead as a reduced-form shock that stands in for some deeper shocks.
Since the wage-markup shock accounts for much of the ￿ uctuations in labor and in-
￿ ation the Smets-Wouters model cannot be used for policy analysis until we take a stand on
the deeper shocks that it represents. Speci￿cally, we need to argue that the shock is invariant
to monetary policy. Furthermore, this shock must be interpretable enough so that we know
whether it is a ￿bad shock,￿which policy should seek to o⁄set, or a ￿good shock,￿which
policy should seek to accommodate.
We turn now to two interpretations of the wage-markup shock.
Bargaining Power of Unions One possible interpretation of the wage-markup
shock is that it represents the bargaining power of unions, in particular, and labor, more gen-
erally. What gives rise to the shock￿ s ￿ uctuations and are these shocks invariant to monetary
policy? Those questions, of course, are impossible to answer given how reduced-form the
model. We tend to doubt, however, that they are invariant to policy. Presumably, though,
advocates of this view see the bargaining power of unions relative to ￿rms as related to the
outside opportunities of the union members and ￿rms. The whole point of a monetary policy
intervention is to a⁄ect the real side of the economy and thus to change these opportunities.
So this interpretation fails the policy-invariant requirement.
For argument￿ s sake, however, suppose we do view these shocks as standing in for
￿ uctuations in bargaining power and invariant to monetary policy interventions. The question
then is, do we end up with a view of business cycles that most macroeconomists would ￿nd
appealing? Under this interpretation, ￿ uctuations in the bargaining power of workers lead
15them to become discontented at working at their current wages and to try to bid wages up.
If workers are unsuccessful at bidding up their wages, they quit (so as to satisfy (24)), and if
they are successful, the ￿rm lays them o⁄. Of course, if the model is to be consistent with
the fact that wages are not countercyclical in the data, then what must be happening is that
workers attempt to bid up their wages, fail to do so, become discontent, and quit. Hence, in
equilibrium, the workers￿greediness for higher wages simply leads to a fall in both their real
income and their utility.
Under this interpretation, ￿ uctuations in this shock are ￿bad,￿and the government
should use all of its powers to o⁄set their real e⁄ects on the economy. Indeed, the general
principle here is that policy should be set so as to replicate the e¢ cient equilibrium in which
there is no monopoly power by workers and no sticky wages. In this e¢ cient equilibrium,
all variables, including labor, are at their e¢ cient levels. Since most of the movements in
labor are driven by this wage-markup shock, it will not be volatile. Monetary policy, which
is a very poor tool for o⁄setting these shocks, should balance the bene￿ts of keeping nominal
wages constant against the other costs in the model of doing so.
Of course, if one actually believes that this type of shock drives the business cycle,
then there is a much more powerful and e⁄ective policy to combat them: the government
should crack down on unions very hard at the ￿rst hint of recession. Such a policy, which
would be of the form that led to (12), would e⁄ectively eliminate business cycles in the U.S.
economy.
Is this a palatable story of business cycles? We ￿nd it far-fetched to think that most
New Keynesians would agree either that this is sensible policy or that it could eliminate most
of the business cycle movement in labor. If, somehow, New Keynesians believe that worker
greediness is responsible for recessions, then they should support this view with some detailed
microeconomic evidence. For example, what fraction of the labor￿ s fall in the recession can
be accounted for by strikes?
The Value of Leisure An alternative interpretation of the wage-markup shock is
that it simply re￿ ects consumers￿utility of leisure along the lines discussed above. This inter-
pretation of the shocks turns out to lead to an observationally equivalent economy in terms
16of aggregates to the one just discussed, but with vastly di⁄erent policy implications. Thus,
without more to go on than aggregate data, the policy implications of the New Keynesian
model cannot even be pinned down. This ￿nding is troubling to say the least.
To get some intuition for this observational equivalence result, consider an economy
with a utility function of the form (18). Comparing (19) and (24), we see that in an economy
in which the coe¢ cient on leisure is given by
 (s
t) = 1 + ￿(s
t); (25)
which has no distortions or monopoly power, the ￿rst-order condition for leisure will be
equivalent to those in a stripped down ￿ exible price version of the Smets-Wouters model
with the ￿ uctuations in monopoly power that gave rise to (24).
The Smets-Wouters model is actually more complicated than the stripped-down ver-
sion because with the Calvo-type way of making wages sticky, wages are set as a markup over
a present value of the marginal utility of leisure. But the equivalence between ￿ uctuations in
the value of leisure and ￿ uctuations in monopoly power holds even in this setting. Indeed, as
Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) argue, in the log-linearized model they use in estimation, it
is impossible to identify whether their wage-markup shocks are really shocks to the elasticity
of substitution in the labor aggregator, as in (23), or shocks to leisure, as in (18).
Note that the policy implications of interpreting the wage-markup shock as ￿ uctuations
in leisure are radically di⁄erent than those of the bargaining power interpretation. Under the
leisure interpretation, ￿ uctuations in the shock are ￿good,￿and the Fed should accommodate
them. But this interpretation of the shock in the New Keynesian model has serious issues. To
get a feel for these issues quantitatively, we followed Smets and Wouters (2003) and allowed
for an AR(1) taste shock and an i.i.d markup shock (as did Levin et al. (2006)). We refer
to this model as the taste-shock version of the Smets and Wouters model. In Figure 4, we
plot the potential and actual output from 1965 to 2005 from the taste-shock version of the
Smets-Wouters model estimated for the United States.
We see that in the period from 1979 to 1984, the United States went through two
recessions that many economists attributed in good part to the Fed￿ s actions aimed at reduc-
ing in￿ ation. The ￿gure shows that as output fell, so did output in the e¢ cient equilibrium.
17Indeed, in much of the early 1980s, the e¢ cient output level was lower than the observed
output level.
In short, are the New Keynesians willing to accept their model￿ s implication that
the driving force behind the postwar recessions is that, in Modigliani￿ s (1977) terminology,
workers su⁄ered contagious attacks of laziness? Are they willing to accept their model￿ s im-
plication that the recessions between 1979 and 1984 had almost nothing to do with monetary
policy? Do they accept their model￿ s implication that the Fed should have tightened even
more during recessions because its actual monetary policy discouraged workers from taking
the even longer vacations from working that they desired?2
In sum, we have di¢ culties with both interpretations of the key shock in the New Key-
nesian model and the associated policy recommendations. Presumably, the New Keynesians
do as well.
Dubious Other Shocks So far we have argued that wage markups are dubiously struc-
tural. Similar concerns apply to price markups. We now argue that also dubiously structural
are the exogenous spending shocks and the risk premium shocks also added to help New
Keynesian models ￿t the data.
Consider ￿rst the exogenous spending shocks. These shocks are referred to by Smets
and Wouters as either ￿exogenous spending￿ or ￿government spending shocks.￿ Unfortu-
nately, the resulting shocks have little to do with measured government spending. For exam-
ple, the variance of the Smets and Wouters exogenous spending shock is 3.5 times the variance
of measured government spending in the data. The reason is that in the Smets-Wouters em-
pirical implementation, these shocks are residually de￿ned from the national income identity
and include, among other variables, net exports. Variables like net exports are not likely to
be structural with respect to monetary policy.
Consider next the risk premium shocks. (By the way, we ￿nd the term risk pre-
mium shocks exceptionally confusing because the Smets-Wouters model has no risk pre-
mium.) These shocks enter the consumer￿ s ￿rst-order condition for government debt, but
not the ￿rst-order condition for accumulating capital. In this sense, these shocks resemble
2Walsh (2006) expresses similar skepticism about this version of the New Keynesian model.
18(unobserved) time-varying taxes on short-term nominal government debt (relative to taxes
on capital income). In the Smets-Wouters model, these shocks are enormous.
In Figure 5 we plot the short term nominal interest rate and the risk premium shocks
from the Smets and Wouter (2007) model3. Note that the risk premium shocks are dramati-
cally more variable than short term nominal interest rates. The variance of the risk premium
shocks is more than 6 times the variance of the short term nominal rates.
The only sensible economic interpretation that we can give to these shocks is that they
are meant to capture ￿nancial market episodes when there is a ￿￿ ight to quality￿in the sense
that consumers￿preference for holding government debt increases abruptly. Unfortunately
for the Smets-Wouters model, under this interpretation, these shocks are hardly likely to be
structural with respect to monetary policy.
B. Other Structurally Dubious Features
So far we have focused on issues with the shocks in the New Keynesian models. The
model also has other features that are arguably nonstructural. Here we focus on two related
features: the backward indexation mechanism for generating persistent in￿ ation and the
modeling of the Fed￿ s policy function.
A Dubious Mechanism for Generating Persistent In￿ ation
Consider next another feature of the New Keynesian model that has important impli-
cations for policy but has only a dubious structural interpretation.
Several researchers, including Fuhrer (1996) and Mankiw (2001), have pointed out
that the simple New Keynesian models, even with Calvo price- and wage-setting, cannot
generate persistent in￿ ation. Motivated by some VAR evidence showing that in￿ ation is per-
sistent, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Vigfusson (2004) have shown that by adding backward
indexation of prices, the New Keynesian model can generate persistence in in￿ ation.
Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007), building on the work of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
3To be precise equation 2 in Smets and Wouters (2007) is the log-linearized consumption Euler equation
ct = c1ct￿1 + (1 ￿ c1)Etct+1 + c2(lt ￿ Etlt+1) ￿ c3(rt ￿ Et￿t+1 + "b
t):
In Figure 5 we plot rt and "b
t.
19Vigfusson, incorporate this feature into their models. Speci￿cally, Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Vigfusson assume that even those ￿rms that are not allowed to freely adjust their prices
at t; mechanically adjust them to lagged in￿ ation, so that the price pjt charged by a non-
adjusting ￿rm j in time period t equals
pjt = ￿t￿1pjt￿1; (26)
where pjt￿1 is this ￿rm￿ s price in t￿1 and ￿t￿1 is the rate of gross in￿ ation of the aggregate
price level between periods t ￿ 1 and t: Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) assume something
similar, except they allow for only partial indexation.
The problem with this assumption is that it is counterfactual. We know this thanks to
the work of Bils and Klenow (2004), Midrigan (2006), Golosov and Lucas (2007), Nakamura
and Steinsson (2007), and others. Their evidence on price behavior at the micro level strongly
suggests that the backward price indexing assumption is greatly at odds with the data.
It is easiest to see this point in a concrete example from the data. To that end,
consider the actual prices charged for a particular product in scanner data from a grocery
store. In Figure 6, we plot the price charged for a package of Angel Soft Bathroom tissue at
Dominick￿ s Finer Food retail store in Chicago along with what the price would look like if it
were backward-indexed along the lines of (26) as is assumed by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (2005). Clearly, the path of the actual price does not look like that assumed. We have
picked a particular series to illustrate our point but we could have shown literally thousands
more that look similar.
More generally, the key statistics reported in the budding literature on the properties
of individual prices are the average number of months before the price is changed. Bils
and Klenow (2004) report that number to be on the order of four months, while Nakamura
and Steinsson (2007) use a di⁄erent procedure and report a number on the order of eleven
months. Note that the New Keynesian model￿ s predictions with backward indexation are
simply inconsistent with the micro data. If we used either Bils and Klenow￿ s algorithm or
Nakamura and Steinsson￿ s algorithm on prices generated from the New Keynesian models,
we would ￿nd that prices changed every single period.
There seems to be some confusion on this point in the literature that uses the back-
20ward indexation assumption. When, for example, Bils and Klenow report that the average
time between price changes is four months they are not providing an estimate of the Calvo
probability of changing a price in a economy which, because of backward indexation, all prices
change in every period. Rather Bils and Klenow￿ s numbers imply that to be consistent with
the micro data the model has to have the prices be completely and utterly ￿xed between
price changes and then on average that price changes every four months.
In short, while sticking an ad hoc backward price indexation equation of the form of
(26) into a model can make the model mechanically generate persistence in in￿ ation, the
mechanism by which it does so is ￿ atly inconsistent with the micro data.
Aside from that inconsistency, the problem with proceeding in this mechanical fashion
is that the backward indexation feature shapes the policy advice from the model. In par-
ticular, as the literature has shown, the costs of disin￿ ation in an economy with backward
indexation are quite high. If the persistence of in￿ ation is coming from another mechanism,
then there may not be such high costs.
The Dubious Model of the Fed￿ s Policy Function
The question naturally rises, is there a plausible mechanism that can generate the
persistence in in￿ ation that we see in the data in a way that is not inconsistent with the
micro evidence? Yes. We argue that the persistence of in￿ ation naturally arises from a
random walk￿ like feature of interest rate policy that is being missed in the current model.
New Keynesian models assume that short-term nominal rates are stationary and er-
godic; hence, the long-term nominal rates implied by that rule are much too smooth relative
to the observed long-term nominal rates in the data. We argue that this discrepancy leads
the New Keynesian models to misidentify the source of persistence in in￿ ation, and hence,
leads these models to give erroneous policy advice about the costs of disin￿ ation.
The gist of our argument follows from two features of the data. First, as is well-
known, during the postwar period, short rates and long rates have a very similar secular
pattern. (For some recent work documenting this feature, see the 2008 work of Atkeson and
Kehoe.) Second, a large body of work in ￿nance has shown that the level of the long rate
is well-accounted for by the expectations hypothesis. (See, for example, the 2008 work of
21Cochrane and Piazzesi.) Combining these two features of the data implies that when the Fed
alters the current short rate, private agents signi￿cantly adjust their long-run expectations
of the future short rate, say, 30 years into the future. At an intuitive level, then, we see that
Fed policy has a large random walk component to it.
When we incorporate this persistent feature of policy into a model, the model naturally
delivers persistence in in￿ ation. Indeed, as Cogley and Sbordone (2005) and Ireland (2007)
show, once we allow the Fed policy function to have a random walk component, the model
needs no backward indexation of prices in order to ￿t the data. Indeed, if we run a horserace
between two models￿ one with a standard Taylor rule and backward indexation and one with
a random walk component to interest rate policy and no backward indexation￿ the second
model ￿ts the data better.
Under this view of research, what happened is the following. Because the standard
New Keynesian model does not adequately incorporate the random walk component of policy
that the data on long rates call out for, a simple version of the model without backward
indexation does not generate enough persistence in in￿ ation. (See Collard and Dellas (2005)
for a demonstration.) To get the model to generate persistence, researchers have mechanically
added backward indexation of prices (and wages). The model so constructed implies that
disin￿ ation is very costly. However, if we recognize that the persistence in in￿ ation is coming
from persistence in policy, then no backward indexation is needed, and this version of the
model implies rather small costs from disin￿ ation. In this sense, trying to ￿x an empirical
problem by adding mechanical features makes the model give the wrong answer to a basic
policy question.
3. Does Price or Wage Stickiness Matter For Policy?
A widespread view is that the price and wage stickiness in New Keynesian models
makes a substantial di⁄erence for the analysis of monetary policy relative to models in which
prices and wages are ￿ exible. We argue that this view is incorrect.
To see this point in the simplest and starkest possible way consider the work of Correia,
Nicolini, and Teles (2008). They work out the monetary and ￿scal policy implications of a
sticky price models in which the government has a rich set of instruments: it can choose
22monetary policy as well as taxes on consumption, labor incomes, and pro￿ts. They compare
the optimal monetary and ￿scal policy in the sticky price version of the model￿ the New
Keynesian version￿ to those of the model with ￿ exible prices￿ the neoclassical version. Their
main result is that optimal monetary and ￿scal policy in the New Keynesian version of the
model coincides exactly with the optimal policy in neoclassical version.
As we move away from the simple New Keynesian model studied by Correia, Nicolini,
and Teles (2008) by restricting the set of ￿scal instruments and adding more frictions the
resulting optimal policy implications of sticky price models begin to di⁄er from those of
the ￿ exible price models but perhaps by not that much. For example, Levin, Onatski, and
Williams (2006) consider a version of the Smets-Wouters model with a very restricted set of
instruments and ￿nd policy recommendations that are very neoclassical in ￿ avor. Of course,
as we have discussed above the details of the recommendations depend on the nature of
the structural shocks, but given the shocks there seems to be little di⁄erence between the
recommendations from neoclassical and New Keynesian models.
In short, then, in spite of our critique of New Keynesian models we view this movement
as largely harmless to policy: the New Keynesians are now rediscovering and pushing policy
recommendations very similar to those made by neoclassical economists like Lucas and Stokey
(1983) made 25 years ago in their justly heralded work.
4. Conclusion
New Keynesian models are not yet useful for policy analysis. The main reason is that
model builders in this tradition have added so many free parameters that the features and
shocks in their models are only dubiously structural.
Changes in method can make these models potentially useful for policy analysis. The
most important change in method needed is to resist the urge to add undisciplined free
parameters in order to ￿t the same old aggregate time series. A far preferable procedure is
to start with a small model, add features and shocks, one at a time, carefully disciplined by
appropriate microeconomic evidence.
One example, speci￿cally set in the context of the Smets-Wouters model, is to begin by
noting that this model has large ￿ uctuations in the cross-sectional distribution of employment,
23￿ uctuations that are ine¢ cient. The primary job of optimal monetary policy is to reduce
￿ uctuations in the cross-sectional distribution of employment by reducing the cross-sectional
distribution of wages over the business cycle. (See Levin et al. (2006).) Given the importance
of these cross-sectional distributions for shaping monetary policy, at the very minimum,
researchers pursuing variants of the Smets-Wouters model should ask whether the data show
signi￿cant ￿ uctuations in these distributions as well as the links between the cross-sectional
distributions of wages and employment. If the data appear promising in this regard, then
these data should be used to discipline the estimation. If the data are not promising, then it
is best to look elsewhere for a model.
Processes of this kind will be slow and painful, but will avoid the false promise of
the Old Keynesian revolution that the profession had trustworthy tools for designing and
implementing good policy.
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